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5.1  Introduction 
Many different measures of the benefit of an in-kind transfer have been 
used in benefit-cost analysis. Perhaps the most common is the difference 
between the market value of  the bundle of  goods consumed under the 
program and the market value of  the bundle  that would  have  been 
consumed in its absence (e.g., Aaron 1970; E. Browning 1976, 1979; 
Fried et al. 1973). This measure ignores the fact that people are not 
indifferent between all bundles with the same market value; its advantage 
is that it requires less information than more sophisticated measures. 
Another common measure of  benefit is Marshallian consumer’s surplus 
(e.g., J. Browning 1979; Mayo et al. 1980, pp. 95-102; Olsen 1972). It is 
now widely known that this measure has no natural interpretation unless 
the income elasticity of demand for the subsidized good is zero. It is best 
viewed as an approximation to a measure such as Hicks’s price equivalent 
variation. This equivalent variation is the unrestricted  cash grant that 
would be as satisfactory to the recipient as its in-kind transfer. In recent 
years many attempts have been made to estimate this measure using 
estimated indifference maps with various degrees of generality (e.g. ,  De 
Salvo 1975; Murray 1975; Olsen and Barton 1983; Rosen 1978). 
The primary purpose of  this paper is to provide empirical evidence 
concerning whether the more sophisticated measures provide markedly 
different conclusions about the distributive consequences of government 
programs. This is done for two programs known to have very different 
effects, namely, public housing and rent control. To estimate any of the 
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three measures of benefit for either program, it is necessary to predict the 
market rent of  the subsidized unit. Our prediction is, in essence, the 
mean rent of  unsubsidized units with the same observed characteristics. 
The Marshallian  and Hicksian measures also require estimates of  the 
trade-offs individuals are willing to make among goods, so indifference 
maps are estimated for various types of families using data on families 
living in unsubsidized private rental housing. These indifference maps are 
assumed  to be applicable  to similar  subsidized  families. The various 
measures of benefit are then calculated for each household in the public 
housing and the rent control samples. For these two programs,  each 
measure of  benefit is regressed on household characteristics. We con- 
clude that the approximations to a satisfactory measure of benefit, such as 
Hicks's price equivalent variation, will in some cases give a misleading 
impression of  the distributive consequences of government programs. 
5.2  Derivation of  Benefit Formulas 
Before providing the empirical evidence, we must specify more pre- 
cisely our three benefit measures. We divide all commodities into two 
composites called housing services and nonhousing goods and assume 
that all consumers of  the same race who live in the same area and buy all 
goods in uncontrolled markets face the same set of prices and that this set 
of  prices would be the same in the absence of  public housing and rent 
control.' In addition,  we assume that no household's future consumption 
is affected by its participation in one of these programs during the current 
year.2 
Consider then a family participating in one of  the two housing pro- 
grams. Its preferences are presumed to be representable by the indiffer- 
ence map in figure 5.1. Suppose that the family has an income Y and faces 
prices (P;,  Pz)  in the private markets for housing services and nonhous- 
ing goods. In the program's absence, the family would choose a combina- 
tion (Qk,  QG) of the two goods. Under the program, however, the family 
occupies a dwelling providing Q," units of housing services and command- 
ing a rent P," Q," . This implies a consumption of nonhousing goods given 
by the quantity 
Y -  P,"Q," 
Qg"  = 
PG 
Recall  that the difference  between  the market value of  the goods 
consumed under the program and the market value of  the bundle con- 
sumed in its absence is usually called the subsidy S. That is, 179  Effect of  Different Measures of  Benefit 
QX 
Fig. 5.1 
Substituting the expression for Q; from equation (1) then gives 
(2)  S=  P;Q; -  P;Q;, 
so the subsidy is just the difference between the market and actual rent of 
the program unit. Since any combination of  goods with the same market 
value  as the bundle consumed under  the program involves the same 
subsidy and since a family is not indifferent among all such combinations, 
the subsidy is not a satisfactory measure of  benefit. 
A measure that does not have this defect is Hicks's price equivalent 
variation. This is the unrestricted cash grant HB which, if  given to the 
family in lieu of  the opportunity to occupy the dwelling unit provided 
through the program, would yield the same level of  well-being as the 
program. In general, 
HB = V-'(U',  Ph, Pi)  -  Y, 
where V-'(U,,  Pi,  Pi)  is the income that would allow the family to 
achieve at market prices the same level of  well-being as attained under 
the program. 
Another measure  that has been used  more frequently in empirical 
research is Marshallian consumer's surplus. This measure is depicted in 
figure 5.2, where D(Qh)  is the family's  Marshallian  (money-income- 
constant) demand curve for housing services. The price-quantity com- 
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Fig. 5.2 
are represented by  points G and M  in the diagram. The Marshallian 
benefit of the program MB is equal to the excess of consumer surplus at G 
over consumer surplus at M.  Accordingly, 
(3) 
This is the shaded area in figure 5.2. If  the income elasticity of demand for 
housing services were zero, then the money-income-constant and real- 
income-constant demand curves would coincide and the Marshallian and 
Hicksian measures of benefit would be the same (Blaug 1978, pp. 374- 
83). Otherwise, the Marshallian measure has no natural interpretation. 
Neither the Marshallian nor  the Hicksian measure of  benefit may 
exceed the subsidy. A famous proposition in consumer's surplus analysis 
is that the Hicksian measure exceeds the Marshallian measure if  the 
subsidized good is a normal good (Blaug 1978, pp. 374-83).  However, the 
proof of  this proposition assumes that the change in well-being results 
from a rotation of  a linear budget constraint. Since neither public housing 
nor rent control change budget constraints in this way (Kraft and Olsen 
1977, pp. 52-53;  Olsen 1972, pp. 1083-84), the Marshallian measure need 
not be less than the Hicksian measure for these programs. This is easily 
seen by supposing that point G in figure 5.2 is directly below point M,  in 
which case point g in figure 5.1 would be directly above point m.  In this 
case the Marshallian measure of  benefit, MB, is equal to the subsidy, S, 
but if  housing service is a normal good, the Hicksian measure, HB, is less 181  Effect of Different Measures of  Benefit 
than the subsidy. We estimate that the Marshallian benefit exceeds the 
Hicksian benefit for about 80 percent of the households in rent controlled 
units and 6 percent of  those in public housing units. 
To  estimate the Hicksian and Marshallian benefits accruing to a partici- 
pant family, we posit that each family's preferences are representable by 
a Stone-Geary or displaced Cobb-Douglas utility function, 
(4) 
where ph and p" are usually interpreted as the family's subsistence levels 
of housing services and nonhousing goods, and y is the marginal propen- 
sity to spend on housing services out of  income. All parameters are 
allowed to vary across families. 
Olsen and Barton (1983) show that the Hicksian benefit formula for the 
Stone-Geary utility function (4) is 
u=  (Qh -  ph)y(Qx -  pX)l-y, 
(5)  HB = [(P: Q," -  Pk Ph)/y]' 
[(P;QgX-  P;p")/(l  -  y)]('-') 
+ P;ph  + P;p*  -  Y. 
The Marshallian demand function corresponding to the Stone-Geary 
utility function is 
Ph  = y(Y -  P"P")/[Qh -  (1 -  y)ph]. 
Substituting this into equation (3) and evaluating the integral gives the 
Marshallian benefit formula 
MB = P,  hh  Q,  -  PghQgh  + y (Y -  P;  p") { In [Pk  Qgh  (7) 
-  (1 -  rEPhI 
hh 
-  In[P,Q,  -  (1 -  y)PkPhl). 
The subsidy can be calculated from a knowledge of the market rent of 
the family's subsidized unit and its expenditure on housing under the 
program.  Although  the characteristics of the  subsidized unit  can  be 
observed, its market rent must be estimated since it is not rented in the 
private, uncontrolled  market. The housing expenditure of  each subsi- 
dized family is directly observed. Estimation of  the Hicksian and Mar- 
shallian benefit requires, in addition, a knowledge of the family's income 
and estimates of  the parameters of  its indifference map. Knowledge of 
the family's income and housing expenditure under the program and the 
estimate of the market rent of its subsidized unit determine the location 
of point g in figure 5.1. This information plus estimates of the parameters 
of the family's indifference map determine the graph of  the indifference 
curve  containing  the consumption  bundle  under  the program  which 
together with the family's income determines its Hicksian benefit.3  The 
Marshallian  benefit  depends on the same parameters  and variables. 182  Edgar 0.  OlsedKathy A. York 
Expenditure on housing in the absence of  the program  Pi  Qk ,  which 
appears in the formula for Marshallian benefit, can be calculated from 
this information using the demand function (6). 
5.3  The Data 
The empirical results of  this paper are based on data for a stratified 
random sample of  about 35,000 housing units and their occupants from 
the 1965 New York City Housing and Vacancy S~rvey.~  The data are of 
the sort collected in the Decennial Census of  Population and Housing 
except that information was collected on whether the housing unit was in 
a public housing project or subject to rent control. 
5.4  Predictions of Indifference Map Parameters 
5.4.1  Marginal Propensity to Spend on Housing 
A family with a Stone-Geary indifference map (4) and paying market 
prices for all goods will spend a fraction, 
(8)  PhQhlY=y+  (1 -y)ph(Ph/Y)  -yp"(P"lY), 
of its income on housing. Since we do not directly observe the market 
prices facing households, we cannot estimate the parameters y, ph,  and 
p"  in a straightforward way. So we proceed in two steps. 
(9)  PhQhlY=y+a(l/Y), 
where ci = (1 -  y) Ph  ph -  y P" p". To allow for the possibility that market 
prices  and  the indifference  map parameters  differ systematically for 
different types of  families, we write y and ci as functions of  the variables 
for location, race, and family size defined in  table 5.1. To allow for 
differences in the observed rent-income ratio among families with the 
same values of  explanatory variables, we add to equation (9) an error 
term with mean zero. Since the observations are generated by  random 
sampling, the explanatory variables in this regression are stochastic. If 
the error term is uncorrelated with these stochastic regressors, ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimators are consistent. Table 5.1 presents the 
OLS estimates based on the 4,014 families in the sample living in unfur- 
nished uncontrolled private rental housing for which the values of  the 
required variables are rep~rted.~ 
These results enable us to estimate the mean marginal propensity to 
spend on housing for different types of families. For example, the esti- 
mated mean for two-person black households living in Manhattan is .0356 
(= .0978 + .0284 - .0517 - .0389). However, they do not enable us to 
First, we rewrite equation (8) as 183  Effect of Different Measures of  Benefit 
Table 5.1  Estimated Relationship between Rent-Income Ratio and Family 
Characteristics 
















1 if  unit in Manhattan; 0 otherwise 
1 if  black; 0 otherwise 
1 if  family size is 2; 0 otherwise 
1 if  family size is 3; 0 othenvise 
1 if  family size is 4; 0 otherwise 
1 if  family size is at least 5; 0 otherwise 









-  .0517 
-  ,0389 
-  .0382 
-  .0688 










-  6.6 
-  6.0 
-4.8 









RZ  = .77; standard error = .09; number of observations = 4014. 
make estimates of  the subsistence parameters. The second step in esti- 
mating the parameters of  the indifference map involves using the esti- 
mates of (Y implicit in table 5.1 and independent estimates of subsistence 
expenditure on housing Ph  ph to estimate P"  p" . 
5.4.2  Subsistence Parameters 
If  subsistence housing expenditure Phph  is the same for all households 
of  a particular type, if the population of  households of each type in New 
York City contains a household  at subsistence, and if  the rents of  all 
uncontrolled, privately owned apartments are accurately reported and 
reflect neither public nor private charity, then the sample minimum rent 
of  such units for families of each type is a consistent estimator of  Ph  ph, 
and its upward bias declines to zero as the sample size approaches the 
population  size. Table 5.2 presents the sample minima  for the 5,675 
families reported to be living in uncontrolled, private rental housing for 
whom values of  all required variables are available. 
The erratic  pattern of these minima suggests substantial violations of at 
least one of the assumptions underlying the use of the sample minimum as 
an estimate of  Phph.  To obtain a more acceptable pattern, we first used 
the market rent prediction equations discussed in section 5.5 to estimate 
the difference in the price per unit of housing service in Manhattan and 
elsewhere in New York City. This is done by  using the market  rent 
equations for Manhattan and non-Manhattan  to predict  rents for all 
uncontrolled, private rental units in the city and by comparing the means 
of  these predictions. We conclude that rents of units in Manhattan are 46 184  Edgar 0.  Olsen/Kathy A. York 
Table 5.2  Sample Minimum Annual Rents for Private, Uncontrolled Rental 
Housing 
Non-Manhattan  Manhattan 
FS  White  Black  White  Black 
1  480 
(429) 
2  240 





4  360 





















Number of  cases in parentheses. 
percent greater than rents of  similar units elsewhere. This result is used to 
express non-Mahattan  sample minima  in Manhattan prices.  We then 
regress the natural logarithm of  these adjusted sample minima on the 
natural logarithm of  family size separately for blacks and whites. The 
OLS estimates are 6.43 + .086 ln(FS) with R2 = .ll  for whites, and 6.66 
+ ,086 ln(FS) with R2 = .28 for blacks. These equations together with 
our estimate of  the difference in the price per unit of  housing service 
between Manhattan and other boroughs are used to calculate the pre- 
dicted  subsistence  rents reported in  table 5.3. While  these estimates 
clearly leave much to be desired, we believe they are better than the 
sample minima. 
Substituting estimates of y and  (Y derived from table 5.1 and Ph  ph from 
table 5.3 into the definition of  (Y yields an estimate of Pp". Specifically 
(10)  PqY=  [(1-9)Ph@h-4/9. 
Table 5.3  Predicted Subsistence Rents 
Non-Manhattan  Manhattan 
FS  White  Black  White  Black 
1  425  535  620  78 1 
2  45 1  568  659  829 
3  469  585  685  854 
4  479  603  699  880 
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The estimates of this parameter were implausibly large in absolute value 
for several family types with unusually small estimates of  the marginal 
propensity to spend on housing. Rewriting equation (10) as 
pxp” = [(php  -  &)/?I -  phph 
makes clear that P” p”  will be very sensitive to errors in estimating y for y 
near zero. Since we believe that our estimates of the marginal propensity 
are implausibly small for several family types, we decided to set it equal to 
.01 when the results in table 5.1 led to a smaller estimate. 
Estimates of P”p” were negative for all family types. This is typical of 
attempts to estimate the Stone-Geary indifference map with data on 
individual households (Cronin 1979;  Hammond 1982,  pp. 102-113;  Olsen 
and Barton 1983, p. 311). In light of the theoretical and statistical reasons 
for expecting difficulties in estimating subsistence expenditures (Olsen 
and Barton 1983, p. 313), it is best to think of  our estimates as yielding a 
reasonable approximation of the true indifference map over that part of 
consumption space containing the consumption bundles in our sample 
rather than as reliable estimates of  subsistence. 
The indifference maps estimated in this section are typical of  families 
of  each type living in unsubsidized housing. We want to use them to 
estimate benefits for subsidized families, so we assume that the prefer- 
ences of  families in public housing or rent-controlled units do not differ 
systematically from those of unsubsidized families. It has been suggested 
that the typical family in public housing has a stronger than average taste 
for housing and vice versa for the typical family in a controlled unit. 
However,  a previous  study using the same data  and the procedures 
developed by  Heckman (1979) concluded that selection bias is not an 
important objection to using the methods of  this paper to estimate the 
benefits of the public housing program (Olsen and Barton 1983, pp. 314- 
15). 
5.5  Predictions of Market Rent 
To estimate benefits using any of the measures requires a prediction of 
the market rent of  the housing unit occupied under the program. To 
make such predictions we first estimate a linear relationship between 
annual gross rent per room and the variables listed in table 5.4  together 
with the product of  these variables and a racial dummy variable. The 
inclusion of  the racial interaction terms permits the coefficients of  the 
explanatory variables to be different for blacks and whites. Relationships 
are estimated separately for Manhattan and other parts of the city. The 
data are for unfurnished, uncontrolled, private rental housing for which 
the values of  the variables involved are reported.6 
Table 5.4 presents the results. In the Manhattan regression, the racial 186  Edgar 0.  OlsedKathy A. York 
interaction for duplex built prior to 1947 does not appear because the two 
units in this category were occupied by  blacks. Other variables were 
omitted  because  they  had  no  variance  in  the  sample.  In  the  non- 
Manhattan regression, the variable for condition of  the unit was deleted 
because it had the wrong sign and was statistically insignificant at conven- 
tional levels. 
Although we would not, in most cases, reject the hypotheses that the 
coefficient of  the individual racial interaction variables are zero at con- 
Table 5.4  Estimated Relationships between Annual Gross Rent per Room 
and Housing Characteristics 
Manhattan  Non-Manhattan 
Coefficients  Coefficients 
Explan-  Racial  Explan-  Racial 
atory  Inter-  atory  Inter- 
Descriptions of Explanatory Variables  Variables  actions  Variables  actions 
Inverse of  the number of  rooms 
1 if  duplex built prior to 1947; 
1 if  duplex built in 1947-59;  0 otherwise 
1 if duplex built in 1960-65; 0 otherwise 
1 if  duplex built prior to 1947 and 
converted to apartment; 0 otherwise 
1 if  duplex built after 1947 and 
converted to apartment; 0 otherwise 
1 if  apartment built before 1901; 
0 otherwise 
1 if  apartment built in 1901-29; 
0 otherwise 
1  if  apartment built in 1930-59; 
0 otherwise 
1 if  dwelling in Queens; 0 otherwise 
1 if dwelling in Richmond; 0 otherwise 
1 if  dwelling in Bronx; 0 otherwise 
Story of unit if  less than 7; 0 otherwise 
Story of unit if  building has 
1 if  story of  unit is at least 7; 
1 if  unit is in sound condition; 




Number of  observations 
0 otherwise 
elevator; 0 otherwise 
0 otherwise 
0 otherwise 
1153.99**  -34.61  920.96**  86.22 
-262.00  -  -  174.34**  35.51 
-  -  -91.21**  -13.30 
-  -  -55.15**  -20.81 
-  196.69**  20.90  -111.87**  -54.14 
-35.54  -345.58  -112.34**  - 
-324.81**  169.17  -223.06**  91.00 
-  160.28**  -84.57  -  163.03**  6.74 
-159.90**  71.29  -58.22**  38.36 
12.20**  37.03**  -  - 
31.38**  -83.13 
-4.30  27.85 
-  17.14  17.35  -7.79*  0.76 
-  - 
-  - 
31.10  -18.16  19.15**  -12.53 
123.79**  -96.45  89.22**  -94.78** 
30.73  139.65  -  - 
0.19  -0.04  0.48**  0.30 
421.59**  -341.18  224.59**  -55.37 
.53  .73 
235  95 
1526  3827 
Each racial interaction variable is the variable BLACK times an explanatory variable. One 
asterisk indicates significance at the .05 level; two, significance at the .01 level. 187  Effect of  Different Measures of  Benefit 
ventional levels of  significance, the hypothesis that they are all zero is 
rejected. The relative magnitudes of  the coefficients are as expected in 
most cases. The main exceptions are for units occupied by blacks which 
accounted for less than 10 percent of  the sample in each location. 
To predict  the market  rent  of  a subsidized unit, we  substitute its 
characteristics, including the race of  its occupants, into the appropriate 
equation and multiply by the number of  rooms. This procedure is satis- 
factory to the extent that the mean market rent of subsidized units is the 
same as the mean  market  rent  of  unsubsidized units with  the same 
observed characteristics. 
5.6  Comparisons of Different Benefit Measures 
The estimated indifference map parameters, predicted market rents, 
and information collected in the survey enable us to estimate the alterna- 
tive measures of benefit given by equations (2), (5), and (7) for each of 
1366  families in public housing and 5640 families  in rent-controlled units.’ 
5.6.1 
The mean  values of  the subsidy, the Marshallian benefit,  and the 
Hicksian benefit of public housing and rent control, along with the mean 
values of  other key variables,  are given in table 5.5; the correlation 
coefficients  between the different benefit measures are given in table 5.6. 
For public housing the means of the Hicksian and Marshallian benefit 
measures differ inappreciably and their correlation coefficient is close to 
one. This suggests that the more sophisticated Hicksian equivalent varia- 
tion contributes little above the contribution of the Marshallian consumer 
Mean Benefits and Correlation Coefficients 
Table 5.5  Means of Alternative Measures of Benefits and Other Variables 





Predicted market rent 
Actual rent 
Estimated “subsistence”  housing 
Age of head of  household 
Estimated marginal propensity 
to spend on housing 
Family size 
Proportion black headed 
Proportion female headed 






$  842 
$  589 






$  395 
$  204 
$  107 
$5,678 
$1,397 
$  994 
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Table 5.6  Correlations between Different Benefit Measures 
Public Housing 
MB  HB 
S  .952  .961 
MB  -  .999 
Rent Control 
MB  HB 
S  .763  ,603 
,956  MB  - 
surplus to our knowledge of  the public housing program’s distributive 
consequences. A comparison of  the Hicksian benefit and the subsidy 
leads  to somewhat different  conclusions. The subsidy overstates the 
benefit accruing to an average family by approximately 9 percent. Still, 
the correlation of  the Hicksian benefit and the subsidy is quite high. 
Rent control is strikingly different from public housing not only with 
respect to mean benefit but also with respect to the relationships between 
different measures of benefit. The mean subsidy is more than three times 
as large as the mean Hicksian benefit, while the mean Marshallian benefit 
is  almost twice  as large. Furthermore, the correlations  between  the 
subsidy and the other two benefit measures are much lower than for 
public housing. These findings suggest that the different measures might 
lead to different conclusions concerning the distributive effects of  rent 
control. 
5.6.2  Regressions of  Benefit Measures on Family Characteristics 
To explore in more detail the effects of  different benefit measures on 
perceptions of  the distributive consequences of  government programs, 
we regress each benefit measure on family characteristics. The results for 
public housing and rent control are reported in tables 5.7 and 5.8. 
In the case of  public housing,  the three measures  yield the same 
qualitative results. Mean benefit is greater for poorer and larger house- 
holds and for households with a younger white head.8  Among otherwise 
similar households, there is little difference in mean benefit between 
male- and female-headed households. The variation in benefit among 
households that are the same with respect to the observed characteristics 
is substantial no matter what measure of  benefit is used. 
However, substantial differences are present in the quantitative results 
based on the subsidy and those based on the other two measures. Among 
otherwise similar families, the estimated difference in the mean subsidy is 
about twice as large as the estimated difference in either the Marshallian 189  Effect of  Different Measures of  Benefit 
Table 5.7  Estimated Relationships between Annual Benefit and Family 
Characteristics for Public Housing 
Benefit Measure 
Family Characteristics  S  MB  HB 
~  ____ 
Gross annual income  -  .050**  -  .024**  -  .027** 
(- 7.013)  (-3.963)  (-4.311) 
Family size  102.523*  *  46.235*  *  52.137** 
(13.560)  (7.232)  (7.795) 
1 if  head is black;  -355.742**  -  265.979**  -  294.169: * 
0 otherwise  (- 13.670)  (- 12.088)  (- 12.777) 
1 if head is female;  70.602  *  5.650  14.597 
0 otherwise  (2.038)  (.193)  (.476) 
Age of  head 
Constant 
-2.051*  -3.214**  -3.089** 
( -  2.152)  (- 3.988)  (-3.663) 
1344.5  16*  *  1311.547**  1331.112** 
(18.375)  (21.199)  (20.563) 
RZ  .22  .14  .15 
Standard error  456  386  403 
Numbers in parentheses are t-scores. One asterisk indicates significance at the .05 level; 
two, significance at the .01 level. 
or  Hicksian benefit for a given difference in income or  family size. These 
discrepancies are easy to explain. Public housing is more stimulative of 
housing  consumption  than a  cash  grant  (in  an amount equal to the 
subsidy) for almost all participants (Olsen and Barton 1983, p. 322). As a 
participating family’s income increases, its consumption of  nonhousing 
goods increases but its housing consumption is unchanged. As a result, 
the program distorts its consumption pattern to a lesser extent (i.e., the 
Hicksian benefit approaches  the subsidy). Larger families in public hous- 
ing are assigned to larger units but are not required to pay greater rents, 
so housing consumption increases with family size but nonhousing con- 
sumption is unaffected.  Therefore, the program is more distortive for 
larger families (i.e., the ratio of Hicksian benefit to subsidy is less). The 
implications of  the alternative  measures  for perceived  differences  in 
mean benefit based on the age, race, or sex of the head of  the household 
are smaller. For example, the estimated difference between the mean 
subsidy of a household headed by a person twenty years old and that of a 
household headed by a person seventy years old is $103 per year. The 
estimated difference in the Hicksian benefit is $155 per year. 
In the case of  rent control, the three measures yield similar qualitative 
results. Mean benefit is greater for poorer households and for households 190  Edgar 0. OlsedKathy A. York 
Table 5.8  Estimated Relationships between Annual Benefit and Family 
Characteristics for Rent Control 
Benefit Measure 
Family Characteristics  S  MB  HB 
Gross annual income  -  .011**  -0.038**  -0.044** 
(-7.235)  (- 16.385)  (- 12.499) 
Family size  -4.817  -2.736  -4.902 
(- 1.213)  (-0.443)  ( -  0.524) 
1 if  head is black;  -  245.995**  -806.917**  -  1375.098** 
0 otherwise  (- 15.377)  (- 32.437)  (- 36.468) 
1 if  head is female;  34.504"  60.673  * *  101.618** 
0 otherwise  (2.484)  (2.809)  (3.104) 
Age of  head 
Constant 
4.112**  2.561  * *  0.794 
(11.123)  (4.456)  (0.911) 
293.101**  405.470*  *  5  10.802*  * 
(  10.662)  (9.485)  (7.883) 
R2  .09  .20  .21 
Standard error  416  647  981 
Numbers in parentheses are t-scores. One asterisk indicates significance at the .05  level; 
two, significance at the .01 level. 
with white or female heads.9 Family size is neither an important nor a 
statistically significant determinant of  any measure of benefit. The only 
qualitative difference is that age of  the head of  the household is statisti- 
cally insignificant  at  conventional  levels in  the  regression explaining 
Hicksian benefit but is highly significant in the other two regressions. 
Finally, all three regressions suggest that there is nothing approaching 
equal treatment of  equals under rent control. 
For this program both the subsidy and the Marshallian measure give 
misleading impressions of the magnitudes of  the differences in the mean 
Hicksian benefit for various types of households. Among otherwise simi- 
lar families, the estimated difference in the mean Hicksian benefit is four 
times as large as the estimated difference in  the subsidy for a given 
difference in income. The difference in the Hicksian benefit to otherwise 
similar blacks and whites is more than five times as large as the difference 
in the subsidy and 70 percent larger than the difference in the Marshallian 
benefit. Large differences also exist for family size and the sex and age of 
the head of  the household. 
5.7  Comparisons of Two Hicksian Benefit Measures 
Any indifference map that can be specified as a basis for calculating 
Hicksian benefit is a special case of some more general indifference map. 191  Effect of  Different Measures of  Benefit 
Since the more general indifference maps are typically more difficult to 
estimate and use in predicting benefit, it is desirable to know whether 
they lead to markedly different conclusions concerning the distributive 
consequences of  government programs. We explore this question by 
estimating the benefits of  public housing and rent control using a Cobb- 
Douglas indifference map, which is a special case of  the Stone-Geary 
indifference map. 
In the two-good case, the Cobb-Douglas indifference map has only one 
parameter that can be interpreted as the marginal propensity to spend on 
housing or the rent-income ratio of a household maximizing subject to a 
linear budget constraint. Since the mean value of this parameter can be 
different for families of  different types, we regress the rent-income ratio 
of families living in unfurnished, uncontrolled, private rental housing on 
their characteristics. The results are reported in equation (ll),  where the 
numbers in parentheses are t-scores. 
PhQhl  Y = .3242 + .0048 MANH + .0698 BLACK 
(6.99) 
(11) 
(38.0)  (0.67) 
-  .0724 FS2 -  .0944 FS3 -  .0846 FS4 
(- 7.92)  (- 9.24)  (- 7.75) 
-  .0902 FS5;  R2 = .04 
(- 7.15) 
The huge decline in R2 when the displacement parameters of the Stone- 
Geary indifference map are constrained to be equal to zero (compare 
equation  [ll] with  table  5.1) suggests the possibility that the Cobb- 
Douglas and Stone-Geary indifference maps will yield markedly different 
conclusions concerning the distributive consequences of  public housing 
and rent control. 
The Cobb-Douglas indifference map has been used in a number of 
previous studies, for example, Clarkson (1976), De Salvo (1975), and 
Kraft and Olsen (1977). In an earlier study, Murray (1975, pp. 784-86) 
noted several differences in the distribution of  Hicksian benefits among 
participants in the public housing program when a Cobb-Douglas rather 
than a generalized constant elasticity of substitution indifference map was 
used. Most notably he found that using a Cobb-Douglas indifference map 
to estimate benefit led to the conclusion that mean benefit varies directly 
with income among families in a single city. Our results reported in table 
5.9 corroborate this finding. They also suggest that using a Cobb-Douglas 
indifference map to estimate the benefits of public housing will lead to a 
substantial understatement  of  the difference in mean benefits among 
otherwise similar blacks and whites. 
In the case of  rent  control, the results based  on a Cobb-Douglas 
indifference map lead us to be confident that mean benefit is smaller for 
female-headed households, while  the more general  displaced  Cobb- 192  Edgar 0.  OlsedKathy A.  York 
Table 5.9  Estimated Relationships between Two Hicksian Benefit Measures 
and Family Characteristics 
Public Housing  Rent Control 
Family  Undisplaced  Displaced  Undisplaced  Displaced 




1 if  head is black; 
1 if  head is female; 








52.078*  * 
(7.581) 
-73.956** 























-  .117** 
(-46.194) 
37.680*  * 
(5.591) 
-  430.917** 
(- 15.870) 
-  166.972** 
( -  7.083) 
-2.884** 
(-4.597) 


















Numbers in parentheses are t-scores. One asterisk indicates significance at the .05 level; 
two, significance at the .01 level. 
Douglas leads to the opposite conclusion. The Cobb-Douglas results lead 
us to be confident that mean benefit varies directly with family size and 
inversely with the age of  the head of  the household, while the more 
general indifference map suggests no such relationships. Finally, the two 
indifference maps lead to very different impressions of  the extent to 
which mean benefit varies with family income and race. 
5.8  Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this paper shows that the inferences made 
about the distributive consequences of  a government program can de- 
pend importantly on the measure of  benefit used and the specification of 
the underlying prediction equations. Additional studies involving other 
programs are desirable to judge the extent of the misimpressions created 
by using approximations to a satisfactory measure of  benefit and highly 
restrictive indifference maps. In the meantime we should avoid these 
approximations (i.e., the subsidy and Marshallian consumer surplus) and 
the Cobb-Douglas indifference map whenever time and data permit. 
More general indifference maps, such as the Stone-Geary and Constant 193  Effect of Different Measures of Benefit 
Elasticity of Substitution, are easy to estimate and to use in estimating a 
satisfactory measure of  benefit, such as Hicks's price equivalent varia- 
tion. Finally, we should be modest in making claims about the effects of 
government programs on the distribution of well-being since any satisfac- 
tory measure of  benefit will depend on individual preferences, and any 
indifference map that is simple enough to use is likely to provide at best a 
rough approximation to such preferences. 
Notes 
1. See Olsen (1972, pp. 1096-99)  and Olsen and Barton (1983, pp. 3-5) for a detailed 
discussion of  the assumptions underlying this analysis. 
2.  Since this is an unsatisfactory model of  intertemporal choice, we did estimate inter- 
temporal indifference maps under a number of sets of assumptions. In some cases estimates 
of  the structural parameters could not be recovered from estimates of  the reduced form 
parameters; in other cases the estimates were implausible. Since we have limited confidence 
in the intertemporal indifference maps estimated and since using them to estimate benefits 
would be difficult, we did not pursue this matter further. See Olsen and Barton (1983, pp. 
14-15  and 38-39)  for a discussion of  some attempts to estimate intertemporal indifference 
maps using the data underlying this study, and Hammond (1982) for a policy analysis in 
which  such  indifference  maps  are estimated  and used  to calculate benefits  of  several 
government housing programs. 
3. Since market prices are assumed to be the same for similar families and the same with 
and without the programs, we can define units of  output for families of  each type such that 
both prices are 1. Therefore, a knowledge of  the differences in prices facing different types 
of  families is not necessary for the purposes of this paper. 
4.  The stratification was intended to increase the efficiency with which rental vacancy 
rates could be estimated. Housing units in existence in 1960  and located in census enumera- 
tion districts ranking in the top 5 percent in terms of  the vacancy rate were placed in one 
stratum. Other housing units in existence in 1960 were placed in another. Units built more 
recently were put in strata according to their age. A description of  the sample design can be 
obtained from the authors. The  probabilities of selection were used in calculating means but 
not in estimating stochastic relationships. For a discussion of  the latter, see Olsen and 
Barton, (1983, pp. 328-30). 
5. No public housing units and few rent-controlled units are furnished. These controlled 
units are excluded from our analysis of  the distribution of  benefits. 
6. Units in single-family structures,  with eight or more rooms, or in several unusual 
structure types were deleted from the sample. Few public housing or rent-controlled units 
have these characteristics, and these deletions reduced the sample used to estimate the 
market rent equation by only 6 percent. 
7. For 3 percent  of  the rent control sample, the Hicksian and Marshallian measures 
could not be calculated because predicted market rent is less than our estimate of subsist- 
ence housing expenditure. The mean annual difference is $266. In these cases we set Pi  Q," 
= Pkp" + 1. For almost 2 percent of the rent control sample and 1 percent of  the public 
housing sample, the reported subsidized rent exceeds reported income. The annual differ- 
ences are $157 and $202, respectively.  Even though benefit could be calculated in these 
cases, we set Y = P,"Q," + 1. Such problems seem inevitable in working with data on 
individual households. 194  Edgar 0. OlsedKathy A. York 
8.  Olsen and Barton (1983, p. 325), using the same data but somewhat different methods 
for estimating indifference maps and predicting market rents, found essentially no differ- 
ence between the mean benefits of similar black and white households and households with 
younger and older heads. 
9. The results in table 5.8 also differ from Olsen’s (1972, p. 1094) results based on data 
from the  1968 New  York  City  Housing  and Vacancy Survey, a different  Marshallian 
demand curve, and a different equation for predicting market rent. Most notably, Olsen 
concluded  that blacks  received  somewhat larger benefits than  whites.  The most  likely 
explanation for this discrepancy is his failure to allow for racial differences in the coefficients 
of  the market rent equation. 
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Comment  Robert Hutchens 
Economists interested in distributional issues have for some time wres- 
tled with the problem of  measuring the value of  in-kind transfers. In 
essence the problem is that we do not exactly like what we can measure, 
and we cannot exactly measure what we like. On the one hand, we can 
obtain reasonably  accurate measures  of  the market value of  in-kind 
transfers, but for purposes of  looking at distributional questions such 
measures are not entirely satisfactory. On the other hand, we would like 
to measure the cash equivalent of the transfers, but when we try to do  this 
we have little confidence in the accuracy of  our results. 
The paper by Edgar Olsen and Kathy York demonstrates the serious- 
ness of  this problem. Their work analyzes the distribution of  benefits 
from two government programs-rent  control and public housing-in 
New  York  City.  For  each  person  in  their  sample they  obtain three 
different measures of  the program benefit: market value, Hicks’s cash 
equivalent, and Marshallian consumer surplus. Their purpose is to deter- 
mine whether the three different measures yield different conclusions 
about the distributional consequences of  the programs. This is a useful 
approach. If  several distributional studies find that Hicksian and Mar- 
shallian measures  yield  about the same conclusions as market  value 
measures, then our problem would be solved. We could rely on the more 
easily obtained market value measure and safely ignore the more sophis- 
ticated measures. Alternatively, if  it is found that the three measures 
yield vastly different conclusions, then we  will  at least know that our 
problem is indeed a serious one. 
The paper opens with a discussion of  the mechanics of computing the 
different benefit measures. The authors confront three issues here. First, 
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market  rents  are not  observed  for the households in  subsidized (or 
controlled) units. Of  course, without data on market rents the market 
value of  the subsidy received by the household cannot be determined. 
Olsen and York resolve this by estimating a hedonic model of rents paid 
by  households  in  unsubsidized units  and then  imputing rents to the 
subsidized units.  In this paper then, the market value of  the subsidy 
received by  a household is a predicted quantity; it is equal to the pre- 
dicted market  rent minus  actual  rental  payments.  The second  issue 
confronted by Olsen and York is lack of  data on individual utility func- 
tions. Without knowledge of the shape of utility functions, the Hicksian 
and  Marshallian  measures  cannot be  computed. To resolve this the 
authors assume that the New Yorkers in their sample have a Stone-Geary 
utility function over two composite goods, housing and nonhousing. The 
parameters of  the utility function may vary by  race, family size, and 
whether or not the family lives in Manhattan. Although there were major 
difficulties in obtaining plausible empirical results for their utility func- 
tion, the authors eventually settle on a set of parameters that in their view 
represents a reasonable approximation of the indifference map over the 
relevant choice set. The final mechanical issue involves calculating the 
Hicksian and Marshallian measures. Given information on the market 
value of the subsidy and the parameters of  the utility function, this is a 
matter of inserting numbers into an appropriately specified mathematical 
formula. 
When Olsen and York compute the three benefit measures for the 
families in  their  sample,  they  find  rather striking differences in  the 
resulting  distributions.  They first analyze means  and the correlation 
coefficients. For public housing the three measures are highly correlated 
and yield similar mean benefits. For rent control, however, different 
results emerge. The means are substantially different, and the correlation 
coefficients are well below one. Next they regress the three different 
measures on family characteristics and find that each measure yields 
different regression coefficients. Finally, they analyze a Hicksian benefit 
measure that is based on a Cobb-Douglas rather than the Stone-Geary 
utility function. Once again distributional conclusions  are sensitive to this 
change in specification. 
We cannot then say that it makes no difference how in-kind benefits are 
measured. This work suggests that distributional conclusions  can be quite 
sensitive to whether the in-kind benefits are measured at their market 
value, their Hicksian cash equivalent, or their Marshallian consumer 
surplus. 
I  will  focus my  comments  on  two  aspects of  the paper. The first 
concerns the empirical methods used in obtaining the three measures. 
The second concerns the distributional consequences of  the different 
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First, it is conceivable that the paper’s conclusions are the result of 
inaccurate information and that in reality the market value measure is 
closely related to the Hicksian or Marshallian measure of the benefit. The 
empirical techniques employed in  the paper rely on predicted  market 
rents, predicted utility function parameters, and self-reported incomes. 
Even if  one grants the assumption that all utility functions are Stone- 
Geary  and that there  are no other in-kind programs, reporting and 
prediction errors may cause the measured benefits to diverge significantly 
from the true benefits. Put another way, if  the econometrician had all of 
the information  that is available to the consumer, he may come to a 
different conclusion. This can be illustrated by considering the Hicks cash 
equivalent benefit. To compute a household’s Hicks benefit the authors 
not only predict the parameters of  the household’s utility function, but 
also the size of  the household’s subsidy. They implicitly assume that 
errors in predicting the parameters of the utility function are uncorrelated 
with the subsidy. Suppose this is not true. In particular, suppose that 
people with tastes for housing that are stronger than the predicted tastes 
tend on average to obtain lower subsidies. This would seem plausible for 
rent control. If  units with a large subsidy (a large discrepancy between 
market rents and controlled rents) are less adequately maintained, then 
people with strong tastes for housing may tend to avoid such units. In this 
case the estimated Hicks cash equivalent  benefit would be biased as 
would the correlation between the Hicks benefit and the market value of 
the benefit. A similar story could be told for income reporting. If  the 
people who tend to under report income also tend to live in units with 
large subsidies, then the Hicks benefit and the correlations computed 
here will be biased. My point is that it is conceivable that more accurate 
information on crucial variables or,  alternatively, explicit modeling of the 
covariance  structure of  prediction  errors could overturn  the  paper’s 
results. 
Such an argument can, however, be made for almost any empirical 
study and is not particularly compelling in this case. If  in-kind transfers 
constrain the behavior of recipients, then a market value measure should 
diverge from a Hicksian cash equivalent measure. Given differences in 
income and tastes across a population, it would be surprising to observe a 
close relationship between the different measures. Although more accu- 
rate  information  on  subsidies and  utility function  parameters  could 
perhaps make the paper more convincing, the conclusion that the differ- 
ent measures have different distributional consequences is in my  view 
quite reasonable. 
This leads to the second point. Can anything more be said about the 
different distributional consequences of  the different measures? Does 
knowledge of  the distribution with in-kind benefits measured at their 
market value tell us anything about the distribution with in-kind benefits 198  Edgar 0.  OlsedKathy A. York 
measured at their Hicksian cash equivalent? This paper is silent on such 
questions, and the authors may wish to pursue them in future research. 
Let me illustrate. Consider an in-kind transfer program that is income 
conditioned. It provides larger benefits to families with smaller cash 
incomes, yet does not affect the rank order of  families in the income 
distribution. Suppose we wish to analyze inequality in the distribution of 
cash plus in-kind income in the population served by this program. For 
this purpose one might use either a market cost  or cash  equivalent 
measure of the in-kind benefits. How would the different measures affect 
an assessment of  inequality in the distribution of  cash plus in-kind in- 
come? It can be shown that under certain assumptions the market value 
measure leads to a more equal distribution of  cash plus in-kind income 
than does the cash equivalent measure. That is, a market value measure 
will indicate the maximum equalizing effect of  the in-kind transfer pro- 
gram. This is then a case where knowledge of  the distribution based on 
market value measures gives us some information on the distribution 
based on cash equivalent measures. 
This is,  however, a theoretical  result. It rests on assumptions like 
identical utility functions in the population  and programs that do not 
affect the rank order of  families in the income distribution. One would 
like to know whether the result holds in a world where such assumptions 
are often violated. Is it the case, for example, that a market cost measure 
of rent control subsidies makes rent control look more redistributive than 
a cash equivalent measure? Are other generalizations possible? We may 
find that a distribution based on the more accurate and easily obtained 
market value measure provides bounding information on the distribution 
based on cash equivalents. In a world with uncertainty about the shape of 
utility functions, it is likely that the best we can do is to put bounds on the 
distribution of  cash equivalent benefits. 
To conclude, I think Olsen and York have written a very useful paper. 
It deals nicely with very complicated issues; it points out how sensitive 
distributional conclusions are to the way in-kind benefits are measured. 
Finally, it raises fundamental questions about where we go from here. 